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UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD
COURTS ALLOW RECOVERY FOR
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BASED UPON
THE FEAR OF CONTRACTING AIDS?
Johnson v. West Virginia University Hospitals,
Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991)
Courts disagree as to the appropriate scope of recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.1 Traditionally, plaintiffs could recover
for emotional distress only if they proved a physical injury.2 Under
modem interpretations, however, many courts have rejected the physi-
cal injury requirement,3 and some regard negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress as an independent tort.4 This progression has led the
courts to allow recovery for emotional distress resulting from the fear
1. Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a separate and distinct cause of ac-
tion and is beyond the scope of this comment. This type of cause of action requires
proof of extreme and outrageous conduct resulting in serious emotional distress. See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 46 (1965) (discussing the elements of
an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and providing illustrative cases).
2. See Julie K. Sardine, Note, The Wavering Line in Invisible Ink; Negligent Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress in North Carolina - Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gyne-
cology Associates, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 741, 747-48 (1991) (providing a historical
overview of mental distress cases). "In early cases, assurance of a claim's legitimacy
was provided by contemporaneous physical impact or injury from defendant's negligent
act which resulted in mental injury." Id. at 747.
3. See, eg., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hospitals, 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980) (holding
that physical manifestation of emotional distress was no longer required). See also Mi-
chele A. Scott, Note, Proving Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: The Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 235, 249 (1989) (noting that a growing
number of jurisdictions have abandoned the physical injury requirement due to the ad-
vances of modem medicine and psychiatry in establishing causal connections between
negligent acts and psychological injury). See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text
for discussion of the trend toward eliminating the physical injury requirement.
4. See, eg., Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970) (holding that negli-
gent infliction of serious mental distress is an independent legal tort); Ferrara v.
Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252 (N.Y. 1968) (stating that "freedom from mental distur-
bance is now a protected interest in this State").
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of future disease.5 Cases allowing the recovery of damages for fear of
disease have focused on the probability of developing and the incuba-
tion period of the disease.6 In the context of fear of latent diseases, the
circumstances under which a court awards damages for emotional dis-
tress are more problematic.7 In Johnson v. West Virginia University
Hospitals, Inc. ,' the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held
that a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress for a fear of
contracting Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) when the
plaintiff proved actual exposure to the AIDS virus, actual physical in-
jury, and physical manifestations of emotional distress.9
The plaintiff in Johnson worked as a police officer for a university
security force."0 While attempting to restrain an AIDS-infected pa-
tient at the university hospital, the patient bit the plaintiff.1 The plain-
tiff brought suit against the hospital12 for negligent infliction of
emotional distress due to his fear of contracting AIDS.13 The circuit
5. See infra notes 29-55 and accompanying text for a historical overview of disease
phobia recovery.
6. Elliott v. Arrowsmith, 272 P. 32, 32-33 (Wash. 1928) (allowing recovery for
mental anguish caused by reasonable concern of future illness or death as a result of
injury, but not for vague or uncertain conditions); cf. Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co.,
98 S.W.2d 969, 977 (Mo. 1936) (ruling that fear of paralysis or epilepsy developing from
head injury was not recoverable because there was no evidence that those conditions
were likely to develop).
7. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text for discussion of cases addressing
the issue of recovery for fear of diseases of indefinite duration.
8. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
9. Id. at 894.
10. Id. at 891.
11. Id. at 891-92. The patient first bit his own arm, causing blood to enter his
mouth, and then bit plaintiff's forearm, causing a deep bloody wound.
12. Plaintiff could sue the hospital because he was not a hospital employee and,
therefore, was not restricted to the remedies under Workmen's Compensation. Id. at
891 n.1. Cf. Bounds v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 172 S.E.2d 379, 382
(W. Va. 1970) (recognizing that remedies provided by workmen's compensation statutes
are exclusive). See generally 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 918 (1958) ("The
general rule is that as between employer and employee, the rights and remedies pro-
vided in the compensation acts are exclusive, within the area of their operation").
The hospital assumed a duty to warn the plaintiff by establishing specific rules and
regulations requiring the posting of warnings when it knows a patient possesses an in-
fectious disease. This procedure allows police officers to take appropriate precautions
before handling such a patient. The hospital did not follow its rules and regulations
before the incident involved in the case. 413 S.E.2d at 893.
13. 413 S.E.2d at 891. The patient announced that he had AIDS when he arrived at
the emergency room, one-half hour before the incident, but the hospital staff failed to
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court jury rendered a verdict in favor of the police officer. 14 On ap-
peal, 5 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed and
held that recovery for emotional distress is appropriate when there is
actual exposure to AIDS16 accompanied by a physical injury17 that
causes emotional distress and physical manifestations of such
distress.18
Historically, courts limited recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress to those cases in which a physical injury accompanied
the emotional distress.19 For instance, the West Virginia Supreme
alert the officer. Plaintiff did not learn of the patient's condition until after the accident.
Id.
14. Id. The jury awarded the officer $2 million in damages, but the judge decreased
the award to $1.9 million due to plaintiff's contributory negligence. Id.
15. The hospital contended on appeal that the damages were speculative and that
the jury was improperly instructed on emotional distress damages. Id. at 892. The
hospital also alleged that the court erred in denying its motion in limine to exclude
evidence of plaintiff's emotional distress unless plaintiff could prove it was reasonable.
Id. In addition, the hospital contended failure to prove proximate cause, improper in-
structions concerning the "permanency" of the injury, failure to include an assumption
of the risk instruction, insufficient evidence to support the verdict, and a verdict contra-
dictory to public policy. Id. at 894-97.
16. Counsel for the hospital admitted that the officer had been exposed to the AIDS
virus through blood to blood contact. Id. at 893.
The admission by the hospital is significant because several cases have held that "ex-
posure" does not result from a human bite. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d
1163, 1167 (8th Cir. 1988) (concluding that evidence did not support a finding that a
human bite could transmit AIDS); Brock v. State, 555 So.2d 285, 288 (Ala. Crim. App.
1989) (finding that the court could not take judicial notice that "biting is a means capa-
ble of spreading AIDS" due to the lack of "established scientific fact").
17. Although the court failed to define "physical injury," it did state that the bite,
which broke appellee's skin, constituted a physical injury. 413 S.E.2d at 892. The court
also noted that the officer's sleeplessness, loss of appetite, and other physical manifesta-
tions of emotional distress were physical injuries. Id.
18. Id. at 894. See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text for discussion of the
court's reasoning.
19. "The [physical injury] doctrine was first announced in England in Victorian
Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888). Curiously, the rule was abandoned
only thirteen years later in Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669; not in time,
however, to block the spawning of the doctrine in this country." Gary S. Glickman,
Comment, DES and Emotional Distress: Payton v. Abbott Labs, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV.
151, 154 n.16 (1982-83). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 361 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]
(noting that when a defendant's negligence causes only mental disturbance, without
physical injury, courts allow no recovery); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A
1993]
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Court of Appeals, in Monteleone v. Co-Operative Transit Co.," held
that a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress when an
actual physical injury is naturally connected or inseparable from the
resulting emotional distress.21 The physical injury requirement served
as a means to guard against increased litigation and prevent fraudulent
claims.
2 2
Over the past century, however, state courts have awarded damages
for emotional distress more liberally.2 3 Courts have rejected the physi-
cal impact or injury standard24 in favor of a standard requiring only
physical manifestations of emotional distress.25 Some state courts have
gone so far as to require only serious emotional distress based upon an
"ordinary man" or reasonableness standard.26 Yet, the majority ofju-
(1965) (noting the requirement of physical injury for recovery of emotional distress
damages).
For an overview of the rules applied in cases seeking recovery for emotional distress,
see Susan M. Knepel, Recovery for Emotional Distress Resulting from the Fear of Future
Injury or Disease, 37 FED. INS. & CORP. Q. 273, 274-77; Scott, supra note 3, at 238-41.
20. 36 S.E.2d 475 (W. Va. 1945).
21. Id. at 479-80.
22. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 179 (Mass. 1982) (stating that
courts "have recognized that emotional distress can be both real and serious in some
situations, while trivial, evanescent, feigned, or imagined in others"); La Fleur v. Mo-
sher, 325 N.W.2d 314, 316 (Wis. 1982) (holding that the physical manifestations re-
quirement ensures that claims are "genuine"). See also Knepel, supra note 19, at 276
("Courts feel that a physical manifestation guarantees that a claim is genuine.").
23. See Terry M. Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A
Solution or a Pandora's Box?, 53 FORDHAM L. REvIEw 527, 531-32 (1984) (outlining
the different ways in which courts have lowered the requirements for proving a claim of
emotional distress).
24. Id. at 532 & n.34; Scott, supra note 3, at 249. The courts of many states, includ-
ing Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington, abandoned the "physical injury" rule because it
was too restrictive and prone to abuses. Id. Under the physical injury rule, plaintiffs
with genuine emotional distress claims but no physical injury were denied recovery,
while those with physical injuries could prevail by feigning emotional distress. Id.
25. Dworkin, supra note 24, at 532. See also Knepel, supra note 19, at 276 (noting
the trend "to require the manifestation of some physical harm which occurs as a result
of the emotional distress"). Cf. Pankopf v. Hinldey, 123 N.W. 625, 627 (Wis. 1909)
(discussing when "physical injury flows directly from extreme fright or shock, caused
by the ordinary negligence of one who owes the duty of care to the injured person"
recovery for the resulting physical injury is compensable).
26. See, e.g., Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1559 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (requiring fear of future injury to be "reasonable"); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d
509, 520 (Haw. 1970) (allowing plaintiff to recover based upon a "reasonable man"
standard for the emotional distress she suffered after her house flooded); Brantner v.
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risdictions apply a "zone of danger" test, which allows those persons
who are within a designated range of the danger to recover for emo-
tional distress suffered as a result of a "fear for their own safety."'27
Less than ten states still utilize a pure physical impact standard in de-
ciding emotional distress cases.28
For over a century courts have decided cases concerning emotional
distress resulting from the fear of future injury or disease.29 Initially,
Jenson, 360 N.W.2d 529, 534 (Wis. 1985) (establishing criteria of "reasonableness" for
determining liability in "fear of future harm" cases).
Advancements in medical science make it difficult to feign serious emotional distress.
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 820-21 (Cal. 1980) (holding that negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress cases will depend on the severity of emotional in-
jury, not physical manifestation, because emotional injury can be found with medical
certainty and can be traced to the alleged shocking event). The "serious" requirement
operates to prevent an increase in litigation, as well as fraudulent claims. Id. at 821.
This "serious" or "serious mental distress" standard has been adopted in Alabama,
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Scott, supra note 3, at 249 & n.93.
27. See, e.g., Farrall v. Armstrong Cork Co., 457 A.2d 763, 771 (Del. Super. Ct.
1983) (applying the zone of danger rule); Mancino v. Webb, 274 A.2d 711, 713-14 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1971) (ruling that parents may recover damages for emotional distress suf-
fered as a result of negligent acts toward their children if the parent was within the zone
of danger to the child); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1983)
(substituting the contemporaneous injury or impact standard with the zone of danger
rule); Resavage v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879, 881-83 (Md. 1952) (holding against plaintiff
because she was not within the zone of danger); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 553-
54 (Minn. 1980) (adopting the zone of danger rule); Fournell v. Usher Pest Control Co.,
305 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Neb. 1981) (reaffirming the adoption of the zone of danger rule);
Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D. 1972) (restricting recovery to
those within the zone of danger); Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d
861, 864-66 (Tenn. 1978) (same); Vaillancourt v. Medical Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., 425 A.2d
92, 95 (Vt. 1980) (same). See also Glickman, supra note 19, at 157-59 (providing an
overview of the zone of danger rule); David B. Kline, Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress in Pennsylvania: Evolution from Physical Impact to Bystander Recovery, PENN.
B. Ass'N Q. 31, 35 (1989) (calling this test the "by stander rule"); Knepel, supra note
19, at 278-79 (discussing the zone of danger test).
28. Dworkin, supra note 23, at 550 n.179 (noting that "[flewer than ten states fol-
low only the impact rule"); see also William Winter, A Tort in Transition: Negligent
Infliction of Mental Distress, 70 A.B.A. J. 62, 64 (Mar. 1984) (noting that "only eight
states still adhere to the impact rule: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Mississippi and North Carolina").
29. See, e.g., Jones v. United R.Rs of San Francisco, 202 P. 919, 922-23 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1921) (mental suffering due to fear of future disability); Watson v. Augusta Brew-
ing Co., 52 S.E. 152, 153 (Ga. 1905) (fear of death due to glass in the stomach); Serio v.
American Brewing Co., 74 So. 998, 1001 (La. 1917) (fear of hydrophobia due to dog
bite); Buck v. Brady, 73 A. 277, 279 (Md. 1909) (same); Butts v. National Exch. Bank,
72 S.W. 1083, 1084 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903) (fear of blood poisoning); Walker v. Boston &
Maine R.R., 51 A. 918, 919 (N.H. 1902) (fear of insanity); Alley v. Charlotte Pipe &
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
486 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 43:481
the cases involved diseases with short incubation periods, such as ra-
bies.3" Courts denied recovery to plaintiffs who asserted fear for an
indefinite duration.31 Gradually, courts extended the scope of recovery
to plaintiffs who feared contracting diseases with unknown incubation
periods, such as cancer and epilepsy.32
To prevail in these cases, courts required a plaintiff to prove a physi-
cal injury and to introduce medical evidence or expert testimony estab-
lishing the reasonableness of the fear.33 Under the reasonableness
Foundry Co., 74 S.E. 885, 886 (N.C. 1912) (fear of sarcoma); Ayers v. Macoughtry, 117
P. 1088, 1090 (Okla. 1911) (fear of hydrophobia); Southern Kan. Ry. Co. v. McSwain,
118 S.W. 874, 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) (fear of blood poisoning); Godeau v. Blood, 52
Vt. 251, 254-55 (1880) (fear of hydrophobia); Elliott v. Arrowsmith, 262 P. 32, 32-33
(Wash. 1928) (mental anguish over damaged fetus).
30. See, eg., Serio v. American Brewing Co., 74 So. 998 (La. 1917) (allowing plain-
tiff to recover for emotional distress based upon fear of hydrophobia and pain suffered
due to painful rabies treatments); Buck v. Brady, 73 A. 277 (Md. 1909) (allowing recov-
ery for pain suffered through twenty-one days of rabies treatment); see also Dworkin,
supra note 23, at 542 (discussing various claims for damages based on fear of disease).
The most common claims involved fear of contracting hydrophobia and rabies. Id.
In general, rabies has an incubation period of one year or less. Id. at 542 n. 117 (citing
MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 69 (D. Hovey 12th ed. 1972)). Hydro-
phobia, in contrast, has an incubation period of less than 100 days after exposure. Id.
(citing Serio v. American Brewing Co., 74 So. 998, 1001 (La. 1917)).
31. See Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 52 S.E. 152, 153 (Ga. 1905) (denying re-
covery to plaintiff who swallowed glass on account of the glass being removed from his
stomach and his health returning to its former condition); Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac
Co., 98 S.W.2d 969, 977 (Mo. 1936) (denying recovery for fear of suffering epilepsy due
to the lack of evidence establishing the probability of the disease developing); Elliott v.
Arrowsmith, 272 P. 32, 32-33 (Wash. 1928) (denying recovery for fear that is "vague or
fanciful" or that continues after removal of the fear-causing conditions). See also
Dworkin, supra note 23, at 542 ("Fear that lasted beyond a reasonably definite period of
time was not compensable"); Knepel, supra note 19, at 280 (courts denied recovery to
plaintiffs whose fears of future disease were not grounded on sound probability).
32. See, eg., Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 74 S.E. 885 (N.C. 1912) (al-
lowing recovery for fear of disease of indefinite duration). See also Knepel, supra note
19, at 280 (noting that the indefinite duration of a fear is no longer a reason for denying
recovery).
33. See Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1958) (allowing recovery for
fear of future cancer from a preexisting burn on the shoulder, when doctor confirmed
fear by suggesting that plaintiff get six-month check-ups); Alley v. Charlotte Pipe &
Foundry Co., 74 S.E. 885 (N.C. 1912) (allowing recovery for fear of cancer after physi-
cian testified that "plaintiff's wound was such that a sarcoma, or eating cancer, was
liable to ensue"). Cf. Birkhill v. Todd, 174 N.W.2d 56, 61 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (deny-
ing recovery for anxiety about a "fictitious, vague, fanciful or imagined consequence");
Baylor v. Tyrrell, 131 N.W.2d 393, 402 (Neb. 1964) (stating that evidence must demon-
strate "reasonable certainty" that anxiety resulted from injury); Howard v. Mt. Sinai
Hosp., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Wis. 1974) (denying plaintiff recovery for fear of
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prong, the plaintiff did not need to show that the disease was reason-
ably certain to occur.34 In contrast, some courts based recovery upon a
likelihood standard: a standard requiring evidence that the feared fu-
ture disease was reasonably certain to occur.3 5 In recent cases involv-
ing toxic torts,3 6 plaintiffs have been allowed to recover for fears that
are not necessarily probable, but are medically reasonable.37 Yet, those
courts still recognizing the physical injury rule have denied recovery
for emotional distress due to fear of future diseases based on ingestion
of or exposure to harmful or toxic substances, without any accompany-
ing physical injury.38
cancer after catheter broke in plaintiff's shoulder because evidence suggested that can-
cer was not likely to result). See generally Dworkin, supra note 23, at 543-44 (noting
cases that allowed recovery when a doctor's testimony supported the possibility of de-
veloping the disease, which proved the reasonableness of the fear).
34. See Heider v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 231 So.2d 438, 442 (La. Ct. App.
1970) (allowing plaintiff to recover for his fear of future epilepsy even though there was
only a two to five percent chance of it developing); Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 179 A.2d
401, 414 (N.J. 1962) (upholding recovery for fear of cancer resulting from chemical
bum on hand although the likelihood that cancer would develop was low).
35. Sheila L. Birnbaum, Tort Damages for Fear and Risk of Injury, PRAc. LAW.,
Oct. 15, 1985, at 25, 28 (citing illustrative cases). Cf. Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co.,
98 S.W.2d 969, 977 (Mo. 1936) (denying recovery for fear of paralysis or epilepsy devel-
oping due to head injury because no evidence that those conditions were likely to de-
velop). See infra notes 40-55 and accompanying text for cases that adopt this
requirement.
36. For a thorough discussion of toxic tort cases, see Dworkin, supra note 23, at
545-74; Knepel, supra note 19, at 289-97.
37. See Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982) (al-
lowing family to recover for their fear of injury from ingestion of contaminated water
upon finding the fear to be reasonable as indicated by medical treatment). Cf. In re
Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634, 637 (D. Me. 1986) (requiring fear of cancer from expo-
sure to asbestos be reasonable for recovery of emotional distress). But see Payton v.
Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 173-74 (Mass. 1982) (holding that although fear is rea-
sonable, the anxiety must produce physical manifestations or flow from a physical in-
jury in order for a plaintiff to recover in DES emotional distress claim).
When the fear is found to be reasonable, the recovery will be limited to the period
when there is sound reason for fear. See Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639
S.W.2d 432-34 (limiting recovery to time period between the discovery of the possible
toxic ingestion and the time test results showed no abnormalities).
38. See, e.g., Plummer v. Abbott Labs., 568 F. Supp. 920, 925 (D.R.I. 1983) (deny-
ing recovery to women who had previously ingested DES for their emotional distress
based upon fear of developing cancer or medical problems because they failed to show
proof of physical injuries); Westrom v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., No. 82 C 2034 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 4, 1983) (denying recovery for fear of future cancer based upon exposure to
radiation without alleged physical injury or impact). Cf. Ayers v. Township of Jackson,
461 A.2d 184, 189 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983) (denying recovery for fear of con-
taminated water unless there is proof of substantial bodily injury or illness). But cf.
1993]
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Several courts have addressed the availability of emotional distress
damages arising from a fear of AIDS.39 In Hare v. State," a New
York appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of recovery for
mental anguish and emotional distress.41 The plaintiff, an x-ray techni-
cian, was bitten by a patient who was attempting suicide.42 The bite
caused a deep wound in the technician's forearm, and people rumored
that the patient had AIDS.43 The Hare court upheld the denial of
recovery for emotional distress because the plaintiff failed to prove that
the patient had AIDS, that the plaintiff was exposed to the AIDS virus,
and that the plaintiff was likely to contract AIDS.'
In Burk v. Sage Products, Inc. ," the district court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that recovery for emotional distress re-
sulting from fear of contracting AIDS requires proof of exposure to the
AIDS virus and evidence that the exposed person is likely to contract
AIDS.4 6 The plaintiff in Burk, a paramedic, failed to prove that the
needle that pricked him had been used to treat an AIDS patient.47
Moreover, the paramedic tested negative to five HIV tests administered
between the time of his alleged exposure and the time of trial.4' The
Burk court relied upon medical evidence indicating that a patient who
tests negative to HIV antibodies more than six months after a potential
exposure is extremely unlikely ever to contract the disease.49
Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. Il. 1983) (holding
that prenatal exposure to DES satisfied the requirement of physical impact/injury,
although no evidence of physical injury). For discussion of the physical im-
pact/physical injury requirement, see Birnbaum, supra note 35, at 26.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 40-55 for analysis of cases addressing the
issue of emotional distress damages arising from a fear of contracting AIDS.
40. 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
41. Id. at 127.
42. Id. at 126. The technician was bitten while attempting to help a security officer
calm the prison patient. Id.
43. Id. The plaintiff sued the state for personal injuries based upon the state's negli-
gent failure to "properly supervise" a violent prisoner. This was the prisoner's second
attempt at suicide within twenty-four hours. Id.
44. Id. at 127. The plaintiff tested negative to several AIDS tests. Id.
45. 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
46. Id. at 287-88. The court came to this holding under Pennsylvania law. Id. at
286-88.
47. Id. at 287.
48. Id. at 286.
49. Id. at 288 (citing Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, July 21, 1989, Vol.
38, No. S-7, at 5). But see Roger N. Braden, AIDS. Dealing with the Plague, 19 N. KY.
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Rossi v. Estate of Almaraz5° involved a surgeon who died of AIDS
approximately one year after performing surgery on the plaintiff. 1
The surgeon knew that he was HIV-positive at the time of the surgery,
but had not yet been diagnosed with AIDS.52 The plaintiff sued the
surgeon's estate for her "daily fear of having been exposed to the risk of
disease.""3 The Maryland Circuit Court, in applying the Burk princi-
ples that require exposure and a likelihood of contracting AIDS, de-
nied recovery based on the lack of evidence showing actual exposure. 4
The court held that an emotional distress claim is groundless when the
basis for the suit is merely "the fear that something that did not happen
could have happened."55
In Johnson v. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. ,56 the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia adopted an alternative standard for
determining whether to allow recovery for emotional distress based
upon the fear of contracting AIDS. 7 The court based its standard
upon the traditional rule for emotional distress, which requires actual
physical injury.58 The court made this requirement more stringent by
specifying that emotional distress and physical manifestations of emo-
tional distress must result from the physical injury. 9 These require-
L. REv. 277, 280 n.24 (1992) (noting that some researchers believe that accurate HIV
antibody test results may not occur for several years).
50. 59 U.S.L.W. 2748 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 23, 1991).
51. Id. at 2748.
52. Id. The surgeon was diagnosed with AIDS thirteen days after he performed
surgery on the plaintiff. Id.
53. Id. Plaintiff also sued for "surveillance damages" resulting from her AIDS test-
ing. Id.
54. Id. The plaintiff never alleged that the surgeon failed to use proper barrier tech-
niques during surgery, nor did she produce affirmative evidence of exposure to the
AIDS virus. Id. at 2749.
55. 59 U.S.L.W. at 2749. On the same day it decided Rossi, the Maryland Circuit
Court decided Faya v. Rossi, Estate of Almaraz, No. 90345011, 1991 WL 317023 (Md.
Cir. Ct. May 23, 1991). In Faya, the plaintiff sued the surgeon's estate after learning
that her surgeon died of AIDS. Id. at *1. Plaintiff sued for intentional inffiction of
emotional distress, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and negligence.
The court denied recovery because the plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to support
her allegation that she was even exposed to AIDS. Id. at *3.
56. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
57. Id. at 894.
58. Id. at 892 (citing Monteleone v. Co-Operative Transit Co., 36 S.E.2d 475 (W.
Va. 1945)).
59. Id. at 894.
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ments, the court reasoned, ensure that the claim is genuine.' As in the
other AIDS cases,61 the court reiterated the requirement of "exposure"
to the AIDS virus.62 Unlike Burk and Rossi, the Johnson court re-
frained from adopting a requirement that the disease be "likely to oc-
cur."16 3 Instead, the court set forth a requirement that the fear be
"reasonable. ' " The court adopted the "reasonableness" standard
from "cancerphobia" cases that addressed emotional distress due to
asbestos inhalation.65  The court reasoned that "exposure" to the
AIDS virus through physical injury made the individual's resulting
fear of AIDS "reasonable.",
66
The Johnson decision is incorrect for a number of reasons. First, the
court adopted the outdated standard requiring physical injury.67 By
establishing a requirement of physical injury, the court impedes the
advances made in this area of law.68 Physical injury requirements fore-
close recovery to plaintiffs with genuine claims. Furthermore, a physi-
cal injury requirement is inappropriate because the majority of AIDS
cases result from sexual intercourse, blood transfusions, shared drug
needles, child birth, and breast feeding,69 none of which are generally
considered "physical injuries." Additionally, the court's requirement
of both a physical injury and a physical manifestation of emotional
distress is specious in this context. Although the court does not define
physical injury, it does note that the plaintiff's wound, sleeplessness,
60. See supra note 26 for discussion on the issue of genuineness.
61. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text for discussion of Hare, Burk, and
Rossi.
62. 413 S.E.2d at 893.
63. See supra notes 46-55 discussing the holdings of Burk and Rossi that require a
plaintiff to show a likelihood of contracting AIDS.
64. 413 S.E.2d at 894. See supra note 33 and accompanying text for discussion of
the reasonable fears issue.
65. Id. at 893 (citing In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634 (D. Me. 1986)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 894. The majority of states have rejected the strict physical injury re-
quirement due to its harsh and arbitrary results. See supra notes 25-27 and accompany-
ing text discussing the trend to move away from the physical injury requirement and
adopt a less stringent standard.
68. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text illustrating the recent
advancements.
69. See Alexandra M. Levine, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: The Facts, 65
S. CAL. L. RV. 423, 437-41 (1991) (analyzing the means by which HIV may be trans-
mitted). See generally Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814, 815
n.2 (W. Va. 1990) (providing background facts concerning HIV and AIDS).
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loss of appetite, and other physical manifestations satisfy the physical
injury requirement.7" If the court accepts physical manifestations of
emotional distress as physical injuries, then there is essentially no dis-
tinction between a physical injury and a physical manifestation of the
distress.7 1
Finally, the court adopted a reasonableness standard, instead of a
likelihood standard, as the test to determine recovery. 2 The court
adopted the reasonableness standard after comparing exposure to the
AIDS virus with exposure to asbestos. 7 3 This comparison is erroneous
because cancerphobia and emotional distress due to the fear of AIDS
have distinguishing qualities. Individuals exposed to great amounts of
asbestos suffer a greater than fifty percent chance of contracting can-
cer,74 while the prospects for individuals contracting AIDS after test-
ing negative for the HIV virus six months after exposure is extremely
low. 75 The distinction is actually the application of the likelihood stan-
dard. Exposure to asbestos makes fear of cancer "reasonable" and
therefore, justifies recovery for resulting emotional distress.7 6 Negative
AIDS test results received six months after exposure make fear of
AIDS "unreasonable" and therefore unrecoverable.77 Accordingly,
70. 413 S.E.2d at 892.
71. Furthermore, there are two indicators of emotional distress, primary responses
and secondary responses. Scott, supra note 3, at 249. Secondary responses are the easi-
est to prove because they are longer in duration and are evidenced by physical manifes-
tations. Id. Primary responses, in contrast, are often more severe than secondary
responses but do not produce physical manifestations of emotional distress. Id. There-
fore, the physical manifestation requirement is inappropriate because it could preclude
recovery for the most severe cases of emotional distress.
72. Other states that have decided whether to allow recovery for fear of AIDS have
used a standard considering the "likelihood" or "likeliness" of the individual con-
tracting AIDS. See supra notes 35, 46, 49, 54, and accompanying text for cases apply-
ing the likelihood standard.
73. 413 S.E.2d at 893-94.
74. Jackson v. Johns-Manvile Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 413, n.24 (5th Cir. 1986)
(noting medical testimony and statistics). See also Knepel, supra note 19, at 295 (pro-
posing that perhaps such statistics will soon arise in the DES and groundwater contami-
nation context).
75. See supra note 44 and accompanying text discussing the findings of the Burk
court.
76. See supra note 37 and accompanying text for discussion of the reasonableness of
fearing cancer after exposure to asbestos.
77. See Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369 (III. App. Ct. 1979) (denying
recovery for supposed increased risk of cancer or other problems due to DES when
there is no reasonable certainty that exposure would lead to disease); Rittenhouse v. St.
Regis Hotel Joint Venture, 565 N.Y.S.2d 365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (denying recovery
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the court should have adopted a "likelihood" standard.78
The Johnson court's requirements are too restrictive for the majority
of AIDS fear cases, which do not involve physical injury. In an effort
to protect the judicial system from fraudulent and frivolous claims, the
court has prevented recovery for genuine claims. Recovery should not
be based upon "the fear that something that did not happen could have
happened."79 Rather, recovery for fear of AIDS imfection should be
based upon exposure and the statistical likelihood of contracting the
disease.
Susan J. Zook *
for fear of cancer due to asbestos exposure because there is no physical indication of
disease).
Underlying the denial of recovery for emotional distress is a public policy interest
against frivolous claims and unlimited liability. See Knepel, supra note 19, at 292-93
(analyzing a "cancer phobia" case and noting the possibility of overwhelming litigation
because groundwater contamination may involve hundreds of thousands of people).
Recovery will be denied in AIDS fear cases when there is no physical indication of
disease and medical probability demonstrates that it is extremely unlikely that the indi-
vidual will contract AIDS.
78. Fifteen days after Johnson was decided, the same court decided another case
involving emotional distress damages for fear of contracting AIDS. Funeral Servs. by
Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991). In Funeral
Services, the court denied recovery because the plaintiff could not prove that he had
been exposed to the virus. Id. at 82-84. The court did not reach the question of what
other requirements must be met for recovery.
79. Rossi v. Estate of Almaraz, 59 U.S.L.W. 2748 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 23, 1991).
* J.D. 1994, Washington University.
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